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Social media platforms have evolved as major 
outlets for many entities to distribute and consume 
information. The content on social media sites, 
however, are often considered inaccurate, misleading, 
or even harmful. To deal with such challenges, the 
platforms have developed rules and guidelines to 
moderate and regulate the content on their sites. In 
this study, we explore user banning as a moderation 
strategy that restricts, suspends, or bans a user who 
the platform deems as violating community rules from 
further participation on the platform for a 
predetermined period of time. We examine the impact 
of such moderation strategy using data from a major 
Q&A platform. Our analyses indicate that user 
banning increases a user’s contribution after the 
platform lifts the ban. The magnitude of the impact, 
however, depends on the user’s engagement level with 
the platform. We find that the increase in contributions 
is smaller for a more engaged user. Additionally, we 
find that the quality of the user-generated content 
(UGC) decreases after the user ban is lifted. Our 
research is among the first to empirically evaluate the 
effectiveness of platform moderations. The findings 
have important implications for platform owners in 
managing the content on their sites.  
1. Introduction  
Over the last decade or so, social media and other 
digital platforms have evolved as major outlets for 
many entities to distribute and consume news and 
information. According to Pew Research Center, as of 
2020, 71% of Americans rely on social media 
platforms to keep them informed.  The literature has 
also documented that the content on social media 
platforms significantly affects people’s political 
viewpoints [1], career choices [2], financial decisions 
[3], etc. Despite the extensive impacts, the content on 
social media sites are often seen by many as 
inaccurate, misleading, or even harmful. Additionally, 
such content often diffuses rapidly and can distort 
other users’ absorption of the true information, which 
lead to non-negligible economic losses and negative 
consequences to the society [4]. 
With the increasing volume of misinformation 
and other harmful content, social media platforms 
have developed specific rules and guidelines to 
moderate and regulate their users and the content on 
their sites. Social media moderations refer to a series 
of actions employed by platforms to maintain 
community norms and reduce anti-social behaviors 
[5]. Such actions can take several forms. For example, 
platforms can monitor the content and/or their users 
either manually or through algorithm-based 
procedures [6]. Content monitoring helps identify 
potentially harmful content. Platforms can either alter 
or completely remove the content, which would 
prevent other users from being misled by the particular 
content [7]. User moderations, on the other hand, refer 
to the regulation of user behaviors on the platform, 
e.g., by requiring them to learn the norms of the online 
community [8]. In this study, we focus on one of such 
tools that restricts, suspends, or bans a user, who the 
company deems violating community rules, from 
further participations on the platform for a certain 
period of time [9]. Major social media platforms, such 
as Twitter, Facebook and Wikipedia, have adopted this 
strategy and would ban certain users from time to time. 
Despite the wide adoption of user banning, our 
understanding of this moderation strategy is still 
limited. On the one hand, banning users dramatically 
increases their costs of inappropriate behaviors on the 
platforms, often times leading to their compliance with 
the platform norms [10]. On the other hand, banning 
users may result in perceptions of unfairness and 
discourage them from future participations, e.g., stop 
contributing content on the platforms [9]. In other 
words, by banning users, platforms face a tradeoff 
between maintaining the platform norms and 
discouraging user participation. Our goal is, therefore, 
to examine the effectiveness of the user banning policy 
on social media platforms. We aim to empirically 
examine whether and how temporary user 





ban/restriction influences a user’s behavior on the 
social media platform. Specifically, we ask: 
Q1. Whether and how does user ban influence 
individual users’ content generation on social media 
platforms? 
Q2. Does user ban influence different users (high 
vs. low engagement) differently? 
To empirically answer these research questions, 
we collected data from Zhihu.com, the largest 
questions and answers (Q&A) platform in China. Our 
data contain roughly 35,000 active Zhihu users with 
their weekly activities (e.g., questions posted, answers 
offered, banned by the platform or not, etc.) between 
September 2020 and January 2021. On Zhihu.com, the 
users who violate platform rules, such as posting 
spam-type ads and offensive content, may face 
temporary ban by the platform for a period of one day 
to two weeks. 
Our findings are mainly threefold. First, we find 
that the users who experienced banning from the 
platform (for the first time) contributed more answers 
than others who had not been subject to any banning 
(Q1). Numerically, after recovering from the first 
banning, a typical user posts about 13% more answers 
(than users without any banning records). This 
positive impact on content generation may last at least 
four weeks since the lift of the ban. Second, per our 
research question Q2, we find that the users who were 
subject to a banning and had a higher level of 
engagement did not increase their content generation. 
In contrast, the banned users with low engagement 
(prior to banning) increased significantly the number 
of answers after the lift. Lastly, we find that user 
banning decreased the quality of answers a user offers. 
Specifically, the average number of words in an 
answer reduces after the lifting of the first ban, and the 
answers are less subjective. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After 
reviewing relevant literature, we develop our 
hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 describes the 
research context and the data. We detail our 
econometric specifications, discuss the findings as 
well as their implications in Section 4. Finally, Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Social Media and User-Generated 
Content 
A large strand of the literature on social media has 
focused on the value of the content generated by their 
users [11]. For example, past research shows that user-
generated content (UGC) conveys rich product 
information in e-commerce websites [12], helps 
predict the performance of private firms or stocks [13], 
helps detect financial fraud [3], and serves as signals 
of job switching [2]. Social media platforms often face 
the challenge of encouraging their users to keep 
contributing content. The literature has explored 
different aspects of individuals’ motivations and 
mechanism designs to spur UGC. Wasko and Faraj 
[14] point out that enjoyment, gaining reputation, and 
social capital are important drivers of individuals’ 
motivations to contribute UGC. Burtch, Hong, Bapna 
and Griskevicius [15] show that financial incentives, 
social norms, and connectedness affect both the 
quantity and quality of UGC interactively. Besides 
those intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, the literature 
has also shown that some design features, e.g., 
gamification, goals ladder, and performance feedback, 
can effectively spur contributions of UGC on social 
media platforms [16, 17]. 
Among the extant literature on UGC, studies 
focusing on the diffusion and consequences of 
misinformation on social media platforms are closely 
related to ours. Vosoughi, Roy and Aral [18] show that 
the diffusion of misinformation is often faster and 
broader than legitimate information. Other studies find 
that misinformation covers a wide variety of political, 
financial, and health-related topics and distorts 
individuals’ beliefs [4, 19]. Besides misinformation, 
other “negative” consequences can arise from the 
content generated by the users. For example, Lowry, 
Zhang, Wang and Siponen [20] show that 
cyberbullying is common on many social media 
platforms. Levy [1] demonstrates that hate speech and 
spam-type content, facilitated by the “echo chamber” 
effect of social media, can lead to ideological 
polarizations. 
As summarized above, the previous studies focus 
on either the value or the “negative” consequences of 
UGC on social media platforms. We contribute to the 
literature by studying the tradeoff between promoting 
content generation and maintaining the rules and 
social norms (from the platforms’ perspective). Our 
current findings show that by temporarily banning 
users who violate the community rules, the users may 
not be discouraged from contributing content at least 
in the short run. 
2.2. Social Media Moderations 
As discussed in the introduction, social media 
platforms adopt various strategies to moderate the 
content generated by their users. The literature on 
social media moderations has shown that appropriate 
“proactive” strategies (to prevent users from posting 
misinformation and harmful content) help online 
communities maintain desirable environments and 
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promote more contributions from their users. The 
effects of such proactive strategies are shown to 
depend on the response rate and interactiveness of the 
moderation [5]. Slow-interactive and fast-non-
interactive moderations are more effective in 
encouraging participation than other strategies. In 
addition, making community rules visible to 
newcomers can effectively reduce online harassment 
and unruly behaviors. Matias [8] shows that this 
proactive moderation strategy increases newcomers’ 
compliance rate (to community rules) by more than 
8% and leads to a drastic 70% increase in their 
participation rate. 
On the flip side, the literature has also explored 
“reactive” strategies that platforms’ moderations take 
place quickly after the posting of misinformation or 
other harmful content. Srinivasan, Danescu-
Niculescu-Mizil, Lee and Tan [7] show that removing 
such content can reduce the immediate non-
compliance rates. However, as we argued, there exists 
the tradeoff between enforcing community rules and 
encouraging user participations. For example, past 
studies have shown that after their content being 
removed, most users do not accept the deletion and 
express frustrations [21]. The same study also finds 
that asking the users to read community guidelines and 
providing explanations about the deletion can 
effectively increase the perception of fairness. Similar 
to our research, [22] also study moderation strategies 
that focus on individual users. They find that although 
a “blocklist” of individual users can prevent harmful 
interactions, such strategies cannot adequately protect 
users from harassment while making the blocked users 
feel unfair. 
A recent stream of the literature has focused on 
user banning, which is the closest in spirit to ours [9]. 
However, unlike us, most previous studies examine 
the impact of user banning at the group or community 
level. For example, Chandrasekharan, Pavalanathan, 
Srinivasan, Glynn, Eisenstein and Gilbert [10] show 
that after banning two subreddits on reddit.com, a 
large portion of active members of the banned 
subreddits became inactive or deleted their accounts. 
Some members joined other subreddits and reduced 
their hate speech usage. Hobbs and Roberts [23], on 
the other hand, document that after the banning of 
Instagram in China, users elicit more information-
seeking behaviors (e.g., joining other censored 
communities). At the individual user level, Chang and 
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil [9] conduct a descriptive 
analysis and find that 18% of the users banned by 
Wikipedia violated the community rules again, and 
30% of them left the community completely. 
Compared with these existing studies, we are the first 
systematic research exploring the impact of user 
banning on individual users’ behaviors. 
2.3 Research Hypotheses 
We rely on the reactance theory to develop our 
research hypotheses. Brehm and Brehm [24] argue 
that if an individual perceives her freedom being 
threatened or lost, the reactance state of her emotion 
will be aroused. The authors continue to state that the 
reactance state drives individuals to engage in 
behaviors to restore freedom. Several studies in 
information systems (IS) have documented empirical 
evidence consistent with the reactance theory. For 
example, Murray and Häubl [25] find that perceived 
constraints on the freedom of choice would alter 
individuals’ preferences over different designs of user 
and computer system interfaces. In particular, the lack 
of freedom will sabotage market leaders’ advantages 
and drive people to competing designs. In traditional 
organizations, Feng and Wang [26] find that when an 
employee perceives inappropriate supervisions, she is 
less likely to share knowledge with other employees in 
the organization. 
In our context, banning a user causes the loss of 
her freedom to participate on the platform (including 
posting questions or answers and all other activities). 
In such cases, the reactance theory predicts that a 
banned user is desired to restore the freedom of 
participation. Chancellor, Pater, Clear, Gilbert and De 
Choudhury [27] find that removing harmful content on 
Instagram did not reduce the production of harmful 
content from the same user but encouraged her to 
create different versions of the same (harmful) content 
and post other toxic content. Chancellor, Pater, Clear, 
Gilbert and De Choudhury [27] note that these 
unintended consequences underscore the possibility 
that removing user posts may lead to more toxic 
content. In our scenario, we argue that after the lifting 
of a temporary ban, the associated user may contribute 
to more content in the short run (because of the desire 
to restore the freedom of posting content on the 
platform). Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
H1. A user contributes more content to the social 
media platform after the ban is lifted.  
Brehm and Brehm [24] continue to note that the 
magnitude of reactance is determined by the 
importance of the associated freedom and the non-
compliance cost. In particular, a higher cost of non-
compliance will lead to a lower intensity of reactance. 
Empirical findings are largely consistent with this 
prediction. For example, Haselhuhn, Pope, Schweitzer 
and Fishman [28] find that in video rentals, 
experiencing a larger fine boosts a customer’s 
compliance (i.e., less reactance) more than a smaller 
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fine. In our context, a user who is more engaged and 
contributes more content on the platform arguably 
incurs higher costs of non-compliance (with social 
norms or platform rules). Therefore, the reactance 
theory suggests that a banning would spur less 
reactance from a more engaged user (because of the 
higher non-compliance costs). Our second hypothesis, 
hence, predicts that: 
H2. After the lift of the user ban, the increase in 
user contribution to the social media platform is 
smaller for a more engaged user. 
3. Research Context and Data 
3.1. Zhihu.com and User Banning 
Our research context is Zhihu.com, the largest 
Q&A platform and the equivalent of Quora in China. 
Zhihu was established in 2011 and has since evolved 
as the largest peer-to-peer network of knowledge, 
expertise, and insights in China. We choose to 
examine Zhihu for a number of reasons. First, Zhihu is 
one of the largest social media platforms with over 220 
million registered users by the end of 2019. Its daily 
active users had reached 34 million, and the number of 
answers provided by its users is over 130 million.  
Second, user banning is widely implemented on the 
Zhihu platform. In our data, a random sample of active 
users, about 18% had been banned on the platform (for 
various periods of time ranging from one day to two 
weeks). Last but not least, unlike other major social 
media platforms such as Twitter and Weibo, Zhihu 
API offers researchers to reach a much wider range of 
information on its site. We take advantage of this data 
availability and obtain rich information from Zhihu. 
On its official page about user banning, Zhihu 
specifies four groups of activities on the platform that 
can lead to user banning.    They are (1) violations of 
national laws, (2) unfriendly activities such as 
intimidate speech and racism, (3) spam advertisements 
including those generated by machines, and (4) other 
malicious actives such as posting “fish content” to bait 
other users. Under each group, there are more specific 
items that Zhihu regards as violating its community 
rules. After a site administrator identifies one of the 
above activities or a user was reported (by other users) 
to have convicted one of those violations, Zhihu would 
first review the case. Then, if the violation is 
confirmed, the account would be banned from all 
activities except browsing the content on the site. 
Depending on the severity of the violation, an account 
can be banned for one day to being permanently 
deleted. Figure 1 shows the profile page of a user being 
banned (or suspended) for three days. We can tell, on 
the top of the page, that the user was under suspension 
due to violations of Zhihu’s community rules (not 
specified how), and the banning would be lifted after 
three days. 
 
Figure 1. The Screenshot of a Profile Page 
During Banning 
In addition to allowing users to post and answer 
questions, Zhihu.com also facilitates a social network 
among its users. That is, a Zhihu user can follow and 
be followed by other users. In this research, we name 
the user who follows another user in a following 
relation as the “follower” and the other party the 
“followee” [29]. The followee’s activities on the site, 
e.g., posting and answering questions, will show up on 
the follower’s news feed. Although most of the content 
on Zhihu is questions and answers, users can also write 
blogs. In addition, Zhihu users can comment on and 
“like” (known as “vote ups” on other platforms) 
others’ content (blogs, answers, etc.). Unlike other 
social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, 
the content and interactions among users on Zhihu are 
centered on knowledge, expertise, and insights. 
3.1. Data 
Our data collection period was between 
September 17, 2020 and January 21, 2021. The 
sample, generated from a standard snowballing 
algorithm, contains 167,900 users and their daily 
records during the study period. Among all sampled 
users, 34,258 made at least one contribution   on the 
platform in this period (e.g., providing answers or 
posting blogs). Therefore, we rely on this subset of 
active users in our analyses. Out of all active users, 
7,376 (or 21.3%) had banning records during our data 
collection period. To test our research hypotheses, we 
rely on the first banning (ever in our study period) for 
a user who had experienced some. 
We obtain a rich set of information for each user. 
For example, we collected all questions and answers 
posted by a user on the platform (including all posted 
before and during the data collection period). We also 
kept recording the number of followers and the 
number of followees a user has, so that we can 
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calculate the number of new followers and new 
followees she gains in each period (daily, weekly, 
etc.). In addition, we scraped other time-variant 
information such as user tenure (lengths of time since 
registration), “Excellent User” badge status (to 
indicate whether a user has made high quality 
contributions on the platform), the number of answers 
highlighted by the platform (because of the high 
quality of those answers), and the number of vote ups 
she obtained. Lastly, we collected a plethora of time-
invariant variables, e.g., (self-reported) gender and 
location. 
From the data, we construct an individual user by 
week panel for our empirical analyses. For a user in a 
week, we first determine her banning status and use 
the dummy variable, 1(After lifting) it, to indicate the 
weeks after the lifting of user i’s first banning (ever in 
our study period). Because such users are prohibited 
from having any activities on the platform, we remove 
the observations for the weeks during banning. For 
example, suppose user A was first banned for three 
days during the first week of January 2021, we delete 
her observation associated with that week but keep all 
her other observations (including the weeks after the 
lifting of the banning). The indicator takes the value of 
zero for all users who never experienced banning in 
our study period. Other variables are constructed 
accordingly. For example, # New followers it records 
the number of followers user i gains in week t. Table 
1 provides the summary statistics of all variables used 
in our empirical analyses. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min. Max. 
1(Ever banned)i 
A dummy indicating whether 
a user has banning records 
0.21 0.38 0 1 
1(After lifting)it 
A dummy indicating whether 
the time period is after the 
lifting of the first banning 
0.11 0.31 0 1 
# New answersit 
The number of new answers 
posted by user i in week t 
0.63 5.39 0 1,043 
# New followersit 
The number of new followers 
user i gains in week t 
99.09 4,727.01 0 817,244 
# New followeesit 
The number of new followees 
user i gains in week t 
1.37 20.23 0 3,608 
# New vote upsit 
The number of new vote ups 
user i gains in week t 
100.66 1,430.67 0 220,917 
1(Excellent 
User)it 
A dummy indicating whether 
user i has the badge by week t 
0.06 0.23 0 1 
User tenureit 
Days since user i’s 
registration by week t 
1,326.74 794.37 0 3,680 
# Answersit 
Cumulative number of 
answers posted by user i by 
week t 
100.80 515.44 0 47,823 
# Followersit 
Cumulative number of 








Cumulative number of 
followees user i gains by 
week t 
376.88 762.45 0 58,655 
# Voteupsit 
Cumulative number of vote 








4. Empirical Models and Findings 
4.1 Regression Models 
To test our research hypotheses, we rely on our 
panel data and leverage the events of first banning by 
the platform to construct a differences-in-differences 
(DID) design. Specifically, our sample contains some 
users (18% of the whole sample) who had experienced 
banning at some point in time during our study period, 
while others had never been banned by the platform 
for the entire period. We include individual user fixed 
effects and week fixed effects to capture any time-
invariant user unobservables (e.g., personal habits in 
posting content on social media platforms) and those 
that affect all users on the platform but can change 
over time (such as a change in website design at the 
platform level). We also include a set of user-specific, 
time-variant control variables such as the number of 
new followers a user gains in a week and her tenure on 
the platform. Equation (1) below is our main 
regression specification: 
𝑌 = 𝜈 + 𝛽 ∙ 1(After lifting) +
𝛾 𝐙 + 𝜇 + 𝜀 , 
(1) 
where 𝜈  are user fixed effects and 𝜇  are week 
fixed effects. The coefficient 𝛽  is associated with the 
dummy variable indicating the lifting from the first 
banning, 1(After lifting) , and therefore captures the 
effects of our interest on some outcome variable 𝑌 . 
Governed by our research hypotheses and the nature 
of a Q&A platform that Zhihu is known for, our main 
outcome variable is the weekly number of answers a 
user offers on the platform. Depending on the specific 
regression model, we take log transformations of the 
count in OLS regressions and maintain its original 
form (i.e., not taking logs) in models of count data, 
e.g., negative binomial regressions. 𝐙  is the vector of 
time-variant control variables. 
Our second hypothesis, H2, formulates the idea 
that the effect of user banning may vary over users 
with different levels of engagement on the platform. 
To this end, we use the badge status of “Excellent 
User,” 1(Excellent User) , and the number of 
answers highlighted by the platform, 
# Highlighted answers , as two measures of user 
engagement and explore their moderating roles in the 
impacts of user banning. Arguably, obtaining the 
badge of “Excellent User” and having more 
highlighted answers indicate higher levels of 
engagement with the platform. Equation (1) can be 
adjusted as follows to capture the moderation effects: 
𝑌 = 𝜈 + 𝛽 ∙ 1(After lifting) ∙
Moderator + 𝛽 ∙ 1(After lifting) +
𝛽 ∙ Moderator + 𝛾 𝐙 + 𝜇 + 𝜀 . 
(2) 
Note that both the lifting indicator and our two 
measures of user engagement (as moderators) are user 
and week specific. We keep them in the regressions. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, 𝛽 , in Equation 
(2) captures the moderating effect. 
4.2 Findings 
4.2.1 Impact of User Banning on 
Contributions. Main findings: Table 2 reports the 
impacts of user banning on individual users’ 
subsequent contributions to answers upon lifting. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients from Probit 
and Logit regressions of the dummy variable 
indicating whether a user posted new answers in a 
particular week. We can see that the coefficients 
associated with the lifting dummy are positive and 
statistically significant in both regressions, suggesting 
that a user is more likely to provide new answers after 
the lifting of the first banning, relative to other users 
never experienced a banning. Quantitatively, user 
banning increases the likelihood by about 3% to 7% 
depending on the specification. Consistent with these 
results, we find that user banning significantly 
increases the quantity of a user’s new answers after the 
lifting. The estimate in column (3) suggests that the 
number of new answers increases by about 2% after 
the lifting (relative to users who have never 
experienced banning). These findings all lend support 
to our hypothesis H1. 
Table 2. Impacts of User Banning on the Likelihood and Quantity of New Answers 
 
DV: 
1(# New answers > 0)it 
DV: 
 log(# New 
answers)it 
# New answersit # New answersit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Probit Logit OLS PPML NB 
1(After lifting)it 0.038* 0.072** 0.019*** 0.120** 0.112*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.005) (0.057) (0.027) 
# New vote upsit 0.000 0.001** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# New followeesit 0.001 0.005** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
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# New followersit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
User tenureit -0.082** -0.128* -0.007 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.041) (0.072) (0.012) (0.043) (0.043) 
# Answersi,t-1 -0.134*** -0.172*** -0.016 -0.308* -0.311*** 
 (0.034) (0.060) (0.010) (0.167) (0.063) 
# Voteupsi,t-1 -0.010 -0.036 0.003 0.193** 0.059* 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.005) (0.083) (0.034) 
# Followersi,t-1 -0.024 -0.044 -0.030** -0.184*** -0.137*** 
 (0.037) (0.064) (0.012) (0.062) (0.052) 
# Followeesi,t-1 0.110*** 0.201*** 0.013 0.030 0.096 
 (0.041) (0.077) (0.010) (0.081) (0.062) 
User FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Num.Obs. 181,755 181,755 181,755 181,755 181,755 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Note:Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. (Default in the following tables) 
 
Table 2 also reports some interesting patterns in 
the relationships with the control variables. For 
example, we find that the number of new vote ups and 
the number of new followees are positively correlated 
with the dependent variables. In contrast, the longer a 
user has been on the platform, the fewer the answers 
she would provide. Lastly, the associations with the 
cumulative number of followers and followees (by the 
week before the current one) take opposite signs. 
Other empirical specifications: In columns (4) and 
(5), we estimate two nonliner regressions that are 
dedicated to model count data, i.e., a Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (PPML) model and a Negative 
Binomial model. Because our contribution measure is 
the number of new answers provided, one would 
naturally suggest estimating models of count data. The 
results are highly consistent with our main findings 
(column (3) of Table 2) and confirm that a user would 
indeed provide more answers after the lifting of the 
first banning. 
An important assumption of a valid DID design is 
that there existed relatively parallel trends (in 
providing answers) between the users who had 
experienced at least one user banning and those who 
had not. Table 3 reports the coefficients of time 
dummies from estimating a relative time model. 
Specifically, we include dummies indicating five 
weeks before the first banning and seven weeks after 
(with two additional dummies indicating 6+ weeks 
before and 8+ weeks after respectively). First, most of 
the pre-banning coefficients are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the two groups of users 
were indeed comparable in terms of providing answers 
before the first banning. Second, the coefficients of 
post-banning dummies are positive and statistically 
significant immediately after the lifting, which 
indicates that a user increased her contributions right 
after being freed to post content on the platform. 
Lastly, we also notice that the positive effect is 
insignificant after seven weeks (including the seventh-
week dummy and 8+ week dummy), suggesting that 
the user’s contribution level drops back to its pre-
banning level after about two months. 
Table 3. Relative Time Model 
DV: log(# New answers)it 
6+ week before banning -0.070 
 (0.123) 
5 week before banning -0.128** 
 (0.057) 
4 week before banning -0.049 
 (0.030) 
3 week before banning 0.018 
 (0.064) 
2 weeks before banning 0.183 
 (0.124) 
1 week before banning omitted as baseline 

































Control variables Y 
User FE Y 
Week FE Y 
Num.Obs. 187,356 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Although we control for both time-variant and 
time-invariant factors in our main specification 
(Equation (1)), one may still worry about endogeneity. 
To further alleviate the concern and also test the 
robustness of our findings, we follow the literature 
[30] and estimate our DID specification using a 
sample generated by a look-ahead propensity score 
matching method. Table 4 reports the regression 
results. The coefficient of the lifting dummy continues 
to be positive and statistically significant. 
Table 4. LA-PSM 
DV: log(# New answers)it 
1(After lifting)it 0.276*** 
 (0.087) 
Control variables Y 
User FE Y 
Week FE Y 
Num.Obs. 17,355 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
4.2.2 Moderating Effects Our second hypothesis 
predicts that more engaged users should have 
experienced a smaller increase (or even a decrease) in 
content contributions after the lifting. As we discussed 
in the previous section, we explore the moderating role 
of “Excellent User” badge status and the number of 
highlighted answers to test the hypothesis. Table 5 
reports the coefficients from estimating Equation (2). 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients 
of the interaction terms (between the lifting dummy 
and the moderators) clearly imply that more engaged 
users indeed provided fewer answers than less 
engaged users after the lifting of the first banning. In 
particular, a user who has a large number of 
highlighted answers may in fact provide fewer 
answers on the platform after the lifting of the first 
banning. These findings are consistent with H2. 
Further, we explore the impacts of banning reasons. In 
the data, most observations’ banning reasons are 
labeled as “OTHER” and a small portion of 
observations are labeled as “Advertisements” and 
“Unfriendly”.  We category the following two reasons 
as malicious reason and explore the moderation effect. 
The result is shown in Table 5, column (3). We can 
observe that after lift banning, the users banned due to 
malicious reasons are actually more active than other 
reasons. This indicates that banning is not suit to 
moderate maliciously intended behaviors. 
Table 5. Moderation Effects 
 
DV: log(# New 
answers)it 
 






 (0.144)   
1(After lifting)it 
x # Highlighted 
answersit 
 -0.793***  







1(After lifting)it 0.128** 0.126** 0.117** 









  (0.204) 
Malicious 
Reason 
  -8.515*** 
   (0.042) 
Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes 
User FE Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes 
Num.Obs. 187,356 187,356 187,356 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
  
 
4.2.3. Further Analysis: Impact of User 
Banning on Qualitative Attributes of Answers We 
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also study the impact of user banning on the 
“qualitative” aspects of contributed answers. Table 6 
reports the impacts on a series of such attributes (all 
generated by Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or 
LIWC). Interestingly, we note that the average number 
of words in an answer decreased after the lifting of the 
first banning (column (1)). This finding indicates that 
a user exhibits less effort in providing answers after 
experiencing a banning. In terms of the subjectivity of 
answers, we find that the answers provided by a user 
after the lifting of the first banning are more subjective 
(i.e., less objective), as in column (2) of Table 6. 
Similarly, column (3) shows that after the first 
banning, a user uses less cause words (e.g., because, 
therefore) which usually correlate with logical 
expressions. Further, from column (4) and column (5), 
we can see that users after the first banning would 
utilize more negative emotional words but less 
concrete numerical data. These findings indicate that 
the banning experience turns a user away from effort 
consuming objective knowledge output and promotes 
weak logic emotional expressions.  
Table 6. Impact of User Banning on Qualitative Attributes of New Answers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Avg. # words Subjectivity Cause Negative Number 
1(After lifting)it -26.353*** 0.004** -0.350*** 0.323** -0.333** 
 (7.262) (0.002) (0.087) (0.144) (0.137) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
User FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num.Obs. 181,755 181,755 181,755 181,755 181,755 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
5. Conclusions 
As social media becomes increasingly popular, 
many rely on such platforms to consume and distribute 
news and other information.  To mitigate the effects of 
inaccurate, misleading, or harmful information on 
their sites, social media platforms have adopted 
specific tools to moderate and regulate the content and 
their users. Specifically, user ban is becoming 
increasingly popular on social media platforms such as 
Twitter and Instagram. A user would be banned from 
further participation for a certain period of time if she 
is deemed as violating community rules. We examine 
this moderation strategy and how user ban affects 
individual users’ future contributions to UGC (both 
quantitatively and qualitatively). 
Our research context is the largest Q&A platform 
in China, Zhihu.com. Relying on a rich set of 
information obtained from the site, we find that a 
typical user would increase her contributions (by 
providing more answers specifically) upon the lifting 
of the first ban. The magnitude of the increase, 
however, is moderated by the engagement level of the 
user with the platform. The increase is smaller, or even 
non-existent, for a more engaged user. Equally 
interesting, we find that the quality of answers 
decreases after the user ban if lifted. Specifically, the 
average word count in an answer decreases after the 
user ban, and banning a user drives up the subjectivity 
of her answers. These findings have both theoretical 
and practical implications. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to establish empirical 
evidence about how user ban affects individual users’ 
subsequent behaviors. Practically speaking, our 
findings offer important insights for platform owners 
to consider implementing similar moderation 
strategies. 
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